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STATElVIENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code § 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. \VHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO BIFURCATE THE TRIAL -- Abuse of discretion 
Regardless of convenience, an order to bifurcate trial "is an abuse of discretion if it 
is unfair or prejudicial to a party" or if "the issues are [not] clearly separable." Angelo v. 
Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957,964 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted 
(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 42, which is identical to the Utah rule); See also Parker v. 
Parker, 2000 UT App 30; 996 P.2d 565; 389 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
II. \VHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT COMlVlITTED ERROR IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SEPARATION AGREElVIENT -- Interpretation 
of a contract as a matter oflmvfor correctness and Abuse of discretion. 
Questions of contract interpretation confined to the language of the contract itself 
are questions of law, which the Court reviews for correctness. Hillcrest Investment v. 
Sandy City, A Municipal Corporation, 238 P.3d 1067 (UT App. 2010). Interpretation of a 
contract resents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Company 
v. Thayn. 84 P.3d 1134 (2003 ). See also Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, i1 9, 213 
P.3d 884 (Utah 2009); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, i1 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2011 ). 
When ambiguity exists in a contract, the intent of the parties becomes a question of 
fact, which is reviewed for clear error. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy City, A Municipal 
Comoration, 238 P.3d 1067 (UT App. 2010). 
A contract interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only 
where the contract expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other 
reasonable interpretation to be given it. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 
1134 (2003). See also Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, i19, 213 P.3d 884 (Utah 2009); 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, i1 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2011 ). 
III. WHETHER THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS CLEAR IN TERMS 
AND INTENT REGARDING SEPARATE PROPERTY -- Interpretation of a 
contract as a matter of law for correctness and Abuse of discretion. 
Questions of contract interpretation confined to the language of the contract itself are 
questions of law, which the Court reviews for correctness. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy 
City, A Municipal Corporation, 238 P.3d I 067 (UT App.2010). Interpretation of a contract 
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resents a question oflaw reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 
84 P.3d 1134 (2003). See also Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, ,I 9, 213 P.3d 884 
(Utah 2009); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ,r 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2011 ). 
When ambiguity exists in a contract, the intent of the parties becomes a question of 
fact, which is reviewed for clear error. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy City, A Municipal 
Corporation, 238 P.3d 1067 (UT App. 2010). 
A contract interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only 
where the contract expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other 
reasonable interpretation to be given it. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn. 84 P.3d 
1134 (2003 ). 
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE SEPARATION AGREEMENNT ON THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY AND 
PAST DUE ALIMONY -- Interpretation of a contract as a matter of law for 
correctness and Abuse of Discretion 
Questions of contract interpretation confined to the language of the contract itself are 
questions of law, which the Court reviews for correctness. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy 
City, A Municipal Corporation, 238 P .3d 1067 (UT App. 2010). Interpretation of a contract 
resents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 
84 P.3d 1134 (2003). See also Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, ,I 9, 213 P.3d 884 
(Utah 2009); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ,r 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
3 
\Vhen ambiguity exists in a contract, the intent of the parties becomes a question of 
fact, which is reviewed for clear error. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy City, A Municipal 
Corporation, 238 P.3d 1067 (UT App. 2010). 
A contract interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only 
where the contract expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other 
reasonable interpretation to be given it. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 
1134 (2003). See also, Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, ~ 9, 213 P.3d 884 (Utah 
2009); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ~ 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2011 ). Higley v. 
Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983), quoting Dority v. Dority. 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 
1982). 
V. \VHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING THE 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE -- Interpretation ofa 
statute as a matter of law for correctness and Abuse of discretion. 
Questions of contract interpretation confined to the language of the contract itself are 
questions of law, which the Court reviews for correctness. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy 
City, A Municipal Corporation, 238 P.3d l 067 (UT App. 2010). Interpretation of a contract 
resents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 
84 P.3d 1134 (2003). See also Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, ~ 9,213 P.3d 884 
(Utah 2009); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, iI 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2011 ). 
When ambiguity exists in a contract, the intent of the parties becomes a question of 
fact, which is reviewed for clear error. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy City, A Municipal 
Corporation, 238 P.3d 1067 (UT App. 2010). 
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A contract interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only 
where the contract expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other 
reasonable interpretation to be given it. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn. 84 P.3d 
1134 (2003). See also, Levin v. Carlton, 2009 UT App 170, ,r 9, 213 P.3d 884 (Utah 
2009); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ,r 13 (Utah Ct. App.2011 ). 
VI. \VHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COl\tl:MITTED LEGAL ERROR IN 
DENYING A NE\V TRIAL -- Abuse of discretion 
Promax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247,253 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 953 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
VII. \VHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
A \V ARD ING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENT -- Abuse of discretion 
Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, P6 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), citing Jensen v. 
Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, P 8, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
STATElVIENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married in California on November, 10, 1986. Their only son was 
born on October 27, 1992. Respondent retired in 1997 at the age of forty-two (42). They 
moved to Hawaii one year prior to Respondent's retirement in 1996. In 2007 the parties 
moved to Park City, Utah. A separation agreement was signed by the parties on February 
10, 2010. On June 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for Divorce pursuant to Utah Code 
§30-3-1 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Respondent answered and filed a 
counter petition for Divorce and Breach of Contract based on the Separation Agreement, 
the provisions under which they had been living for more than 18 months. 
5 
A trial was held from April 28 to April 30, 2015. On July 23, 2015, Judge Kara 
Pettit, Third Judicial District Court, entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Decree of Divorce and Judgment. On August 8, 2015, both parties filed timely post-trial 
motions pursuant to Rules 52, 59, and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing 
was held on the post-trial motions on November 2, 2015. At the hearing, the Court 
admitted errors had been made, specifically regarding the allotment of cash proceeds for 
the 10 lots identified in the Separation Agreement and awarded to Respondent as separate 
property ($335,000) and other property distributions. Confusion of the Court's July order 
was obvious and proliferated. Additional Supplemental briefing was permitted and Rule 
60 Motions were filed by Respondent. 1 
The Court found under Rule 62U)(2)(A) the presumptive bond amount to be 
$487,106.14, which Respondent has posted in a trust account with the Summit County 
Court. The Original Notice of Appeal was filed on December 15, 2015, and the Amended 
Notice of Appeal filed on February 3, 2016. 
STATEl\tlENT OF FACTS 
George Sandusky and Kylee Sandusky were married on November 10, 1986 
(Findings of Fact No. 1). They have one adult child (Findings of Fact No. 9). They moved 
to Park City, Utah in 2007 (Findings of Fact No. 47 at p.26). George was retired and 
neither party worked while living in Park City (Findings of Fact No. 36 and 47, p.26). 
1 11/05/2015 Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Ruling Pursuant to Rule 60(b) for Relief 
from Judgment and Order. 
12/4/2015 Rule 60(b) Motion. 
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On February 10,2010, the parties executed a Separation Agreement and Addendum 
(Findings of Fact No. 10, 13 and 21 ). Petitioner and Respondent spent time discussing the 
specifics to input into the form Separation Agreement (Findings of Fact No. 16). The 
Agreement was clear on its face describing the document and its purpose, a desire to 
confirm separation of the parties and settlement of their property rights growing out of their 
marital relationship (Findings of Fact No. 19). 
For approximately 16 months after execution of the Separation Agreement, the 
parties complied with the terms all the way up until the time Petitioner retained and attorney 
and filed for divorce wherein she sought to declare the separation agreement void on the 
grounds that she was ··duped into signing the Agreement by Respondent misleading her 
that it was only for the purpose of financial aid for their son" (Findings of Fact Nos. 22, 23 
and 24 ). Both Petitioner and Respondent understood the Separation Agreement was for 
purpose of their separation. It was undisputed that both parties were aware of the assets of 
each other and the financial account statements were accessible to each of them had they 
wanted to verify how much was in the accounts as of the date they executed the Separation 
Agreement (Findings of Fact No. 31 ). 
The Separation Agreement awarded each party their bank accounts, specifically for 
Petitioner "checking and savings accounts and 401K" and for Respondent, '·checking and 
savings accounts and retirement pension" (Findings of Fact Nos. 35 and 36). Neither party 
argued or testified that they did not understand which checking and savings accounts were 
being referenced. Respondent testified in detail about the parties' finances including their 
individual checking and savings accounts (Transcript April 29, page 134 L 6-11 and L 23-
7 
25, page 171, L 6-22 and Transcript April 30, page 83, L 2-19). Petitioner offered no 
contrary evidence. She testified that she did not know the legal analysis that is applied to 
detennine whether property is marital or separate (Findings of Fact No. 33). 
Respondent testified in detail about the understanding and intent of the parties in 
outlining the property division as they did in the Separation Agreement, specifically that 
the parties had 1.2 million and change; Respondent would retain $400,000 of the equity 
from the Dover property, a duplex, half of which was purchased by Respondent prior to 
the marriage and ½ purchased after the marriage, but which Petitioner singed a quit claim 
deed to Respondent after the marriage, and they would split the rest [approx. $800,000] 
equally. The monthly payments characterized as "alimony" were a calculation of 6% 
interest on the $400,000 lump sum amount identified in the Addendum (Transcript April 
29, page 191, L 9-19 and April 30, P. 163-164). Respondent's testimony as to their 
discussion was uncontroverted. Petitioner is highly educated, having a master's degree in 
Education and Respondent is a highly sophisticated business man, so to attribute a lack of 
knowledge [re: Separation Agreement] is not consistent with whom they are (Findings of 
Fact at p.28). During the pendency of the divorce matter, Respondent placed the balance 
of the $400,000 lump sum payment pursuant to the Addendum in a trust account 
(Transcript April 30, page 4 7, L 12-18 and Transcript April 29, page 44, L 9). Petitioner 
had taken $90,000 from the Hawaii bank account (Findings of Fact P.37), (Transcript April 
28, page 262, L4-6), and (Transcript April 29, page 87, L 6-12). 
Petitioner filed a verified petition for divorce on June 3, 2011, pursuant to Utah 
Code §30-3-1 on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. (Findings of Fact Nos. 2 and 
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30). Prior to and during the marriage, Respondent purchased properties, fixed them up, 
and then sold them. By the time he retired in 1997, he had accumulated approximately 
$400,000 from these investments (Transcript April 29, page 196, L 10-12; 23-25 and page 
198, L 21-25, and Transcript April 30, page 163, L 3-9) Respondent testified that he always 
had a separate account with sister that was established prior to marriage and that they 
[Petitioner and Respondent] maintained separate bank accounts throughout marriage 
(Transcript April 29, page 118, L 4-12). Petitioner did not dispute Respondent's testimony. 
Respondent also entered into ··hard money loans" as part of his investments 
(Transcript April 29, page 176, L 24 through page 182, L 9). None were outstanding at the 
time of trial, including loans to his sister and Mike Anderson (G. Sandusky Depo 94, L 10-
18)2. Respondent also received $42,000 in settlement proceeds from a motorcycle accident 
(G. Sandusky Depo. Volume II, page 53, L 17-18), Transcript, April 30, page 35, L 22 
through page 36, L25), (Transcript April 30, Page 51 lines 18-23), and (Transcript April 
30, Page 52 lines 14-18). 
I. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
BIFURCATE THE TRIAL 
The validity of the Separation Agreement was central to the case. Failure to divide 
the issues to determination of the validity of the separation first caused confusion and 
mistake that was prejudicial to Respondent. 
2 Admitted into evidence, Judge Pettit said ··Are you moving to publish [Mr. Sandusky"s 
deposition]?" Mr. Morken said ''Yes, please." (April 30, 2015 Trial CD 13 :59:05-
13:57 :43 ). 
9 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMl\tlITTED ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT REGARDING SEP ARA TE 
PROPERTY 
The Separation Agreement executed by the parties was clear in its intent and 
division of assets. Specifically, it was understood and agreed that Respondent would 
maintain his pre-marital property, accumulated and appreciated from the Dover property, 
half acquired prior to the parties· marriage and with funds kept separate and apart from 
marital assets. The distribution made by the Court was not consistent with the Separation 
Agreement and was inequitable. 
111. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT \VAS CLEAR IN TERMS AND 
INTENT 
The Intent of the property division pursuant to the Separation Agreement was clear 
and the distribution equitable and as a result the property division agreed to by the parties 
should not have been disturbed. The Court found the Separation Agreement Valid and 
therefore should have been enforced in its entirety and as agreed to by the parties and under 
which they lived. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN FAILING TO 
PROPERLY RULE ON THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY AND PAST DUE 
ALIMONY. 
The Court's order is inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the Separation 
Agreement and results in an inequitable distribution. The Separation Agreement was valid 
and clear in its intent. It was equitable. The Court's order is not consistent with the 
Separation Agreement and the understanding of the parties. The court's order disregarded 
evidence of additional income in determining need and ability to pay. 
10 
r 
i . 
IJilliJ 
,·, 
r 
I 
I 
6ii 
r·· 
,-
' 
r 
r 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RENDERING THE 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE. 
The Separation Agreement was not ambiguous to warrant the Court·s re-disposition 
of property already agreed-upon by the parties. The court incorrectly identified and 
referenced in its Orders assets, approximately double the amount of assets in the estate. 
The distribution of the assets by the Court did not conform to the Separation Agreement 
and were overstated and resulted in an inequitable distribution. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT COMl\HTTED LEGAL ERROR IN DENYING A 
NE\VTRIAL. 
The Court's ruling was inconsistent, inaccurate and confusing. The Separation 
Agreement was found valid and accurately described the property distribution but was not 
followed. The Court had significant miscalculations and disregarded the intent of the 
parties' agreement. The property distribution was inequitable even though the court 
intended it to be equitable (50/50). Respondent was prejudiced by the mistakes and 
confusion and a new trial to fairly adjudicate the issues was required. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
A \V ARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENT 
The parties' entered into a valid Separation Agreement that they lived by for 16 
months. Petitioner decided to challenge the Agreement after consulting with her counsel. 
She was found not credible (Findings of Fact No. 13), including her arguments to void the 
Separation Agreement. Respondent was required to defend the validity of the Separation 
Agreement for more than 5 years and even after the Separation Agreement was ruled valid, 
he was required to engage in significant post trial motions to enforce its provisions. 
11 
I. 
ARGUMENTS 
FAILURE TO BIFURCATE THE PROCEEDINGS \VAS PREJUDICIAL 
AND THUS ERROR. 
Rule 42(b) permits a trial court, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice," to order a separate trial of "any claim" or "any separate issue." Regardless of 
convenience, an order to bifurcate trial "is an abuse of discretion if it is unfair or prejudicial 
to a party" or if "the issues are [not] clearly separable." Here, clear distinction between 
issues. A determination of the Separation Agreement being valid and enforceable allowed 
the parties to tailor issues to those left to be determined. Angelo v. Armstrong World 
Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 42, 
which is identical to the Utah rule)~ Lutron Elecs. Co. v. Crestron Elecs .. Inc., 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 69207, 8-9 (D. Utah May 14, 2013). See Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30; 
996 P.2d 565; 389 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure gives trial courts discretion to bifurcate proceedings in appropriate 
situations.). In this case, the trial court's refusal to bifurcate the proceedings caused undue 
prejudice to the Respondent. The Court's rnling on this issue caused confusion, mistakes, 
and prejudice to Respondent. The complexity of the issues did not allow Respondent to 
present complete evidence on all issues in the time set for trial. This confusion is 
particularly evident by the court's erroneous interpretation of evidence concerning the 
intent of the Separation Agreement, the distribution of the property, and the bank accounts 
of the parties as identified in the Separation Agreement and the Court calculating loans 
made to individuals by the Respondent that were undisputedly previously repaid. The 
12 
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original Judgement identified assets of the marital estate two times larger than was 
supported by evidence and testimony. Order of Honorable Judge Kara L. Pettit, Case No.: 
114500103, January 05 ~ 2016, p.4, 1 7(ii) c·[T]he Court agrees that it made a mistake by 
not excluding the lot proceeds ... The Court awarded such proceeds ... but it mistakenly did 
not separate those proceeds from the balance of the funds in account #7833400.''). Further, 
the Court identified and referenced assets of more than $2.2 million dollars, double the 
amount of the actual assets of the marital estate testified to by the parties. 
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to Utah's rule, 
permits a district court to bifurcate claims and counterclaims "[f]or convenience, to avoid 
prejudice, or to expedite and economize." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The rule gives trial courts 
broad discretion to determine whether bifurcation is appropriate. United States ex rel. 
Bahrani v. ConAgra, Inc., 624 F.3d 1275, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010). See Angelo, supra, at 964 
C" While separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered, it is important that it 
be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its worth."') (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
42(b) advisory committee's note). 
Utah decisions suggest that a court should consider these determining bifurcation: 
(I) judicial economy, (2) convenience to the parties, (3) expedition, and ( 4) avoidance of 
prejudice and confusion. Sensitron, Inc. v. Wallace. 504 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186 (D. Utah 
2007) (footnotes and citations omitted). However, the most significant factor for the court 
is the complexity of the case where substantive differences and the potential for confusion 
are appreciable. Lutron Elecs. Co., supra, at 8-9. See also, Unger v. Ralph Smith Co., 
13 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107470 (D. Utah Oct. 7, 2010). Claims maybe bifurcated, however, 
only when "the issues are clearly separable." Mandeville v. Ouinstar Corp., 109 Fed. Appx. 
191, 194 (l 0th Cir. 2004) ( quotations and citation omitted). Here, the validity of the 
Separation Agreement was clearly separable. The asset distribution pursuant to the 
Separation Agreement was simple but the asset determination and distribution of marital 
and separate property without such an agreement was complex and required a separate trial 
itself. The trial court clearly did not fully understand that bank accounts were owned 
separately by the parties or that certain loans by Respondent were previously repaid and 
cleared, as evidenced by Respondent's testimony and the evidence. (Transcript April 30, 
Page 51 lines 18-23 ), (Transcript April 30, Page 52 lines 14-18) (G. Sandusky Depo 94, L 
10-18, also included Exhibit 6 filed as pleading tiled Exhibits 6-10 on May 5, 2014). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT REGARDING RESPONDENT'S 
PREMARITAL SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
The premarital property in question, specifically, the $400,000 the parties 
contemplated in the signed Separation Agreement, Respondent accumulated in 
appreciation from property owned by him prior to the marriage. Respondent had 
significant assets and a pension before marriage. Petitioner had little. Respondent testified 
thoroughly on this matter, and Petitioner offered no contrary evidence. (Transcript April 
29, page 196, L 10-12 and page 198, L 21-25, and Transcript April 30, page 163, L 3-9) 
(Transcript April 29, page 196, L 23-25). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a district court is required to conduct the 
following analysis prior to the distribution of marital assets: (1) "identify the property in 
dispute and determine whether [it] is marital or separate property," (2) "consider whether 
there are exceptional circumstances that overcome the general presumption that marital 
property be divided equally," (3) "assign values to each item of marital property so that [a] 
distribution strategy ... can be implemented," and (4) distribute the marital assets 
"consistent with the distribution strategy." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 
,r 15, 176 P.3d 476. See Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982) (divorce decree 
affirmed awarding each party the real and personal property he or she brought to the 
marriage or inherited during the marriage). In this case the trial court erred in failing to 
determine that certain assets were separate property of Respondent purchased prior to the 
marriage or from his separate bank account, rather than constituting marital assets. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that district courts must enter findings of fact which establish 
that the court's "judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988). Further, the appellate 
court will not set aside findings of fact, '"whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
unless they are clearly erroneous." Here, there was undisputed evidence that certain 
assets-namely the lots and the LAFCU account #400 bank account were the property of 
Respondent acquired before the marriage and maintained separately from any comingled 
marital assets. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,r 121 (Utah 2015) (Utah Code§ 30-3-5(1) 
gives the courts authority to issue "equitable orders" concerning marital property in divorce 
cases); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). In making this determination, the 
15 
Burke Court suggested that the court consider a variety of factors, one of which is "whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage ... '· Id. Further, "[i]n appropriate 
circumstances [,] equity requires that each party recover the separate property brought into 
or received during the marriage." Id., at 135. Further, this court has held that "[e]ach party 
is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the 
marital property." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also Preston, supra, at 706 (holding that the husband was 
entitled to a credit for costs he paid for the construction of the marital home, because "the 
evidence was uncontradicted that [ the amount] came from the husband's sale of assets he 
owned prior to the marriage, and only the balance from his earnings during the marriage"). 
The appropriate distribution of property rests on the overriding consideration that the 
ultimate division be equitable, or fairly divided between the parties, 'given their 
contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce." 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (Utah 1987). 
III. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT \VAS CLEAR IN ITS TERMS AND 
INTENT. 
Utah law stipulates that the g~veming principle is that ''contracts between spouses 
are enforceable and 'generally subject to ordinary contract principles' so long as they are 
negotiated 'in good faith ... and do not unreasonably constrain the [divorce] court's 
equitable and statutory duties."' Ashby v. Ashby. 20 l O UT 7, iJ 21, 227 P.3d 246 (Utah 
20 l 0) (alteration and omission in original) (citations omitted). See Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 
1248, 1251 (Utah 1980) ("·Where possible, the underlying intent of a contract is to be 
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gleaned from the language of the instrument itself; only where the language is uncertain or 
ambiguous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to."). 
The trial Court did not find Petitioner credible and did not agree with her position 
in the case that the only purpose for the separation agreement was to obtain financial aid 
for the couple~s son's college expenses. (Judgment and Findings of Fact by the Court, p.3, 
no.13). The parties lived under the terms of the agreement for 16 months, and the terms 
were understood by the parties as evidenced by their ratification and conduct following the 
agreement execution. See Order of Honorable Judge Kara L. Pettit, Case No.: 114500103, 
January 05, 2016, p.3, 1 6 (Trial court confirmed ;;that the evidence demonstrated that 
Respondent paid Petitioner $2,000 per month in alimony from March 20 l O through June 
2011 (total of $32,000). "). Petitioner accepted the monthly payments of $2,000, filed tax 
returns indicating that the payments were alimony-until as she admitted on cross-
examination at trial that she was advised by counsel to amend the tax returns (Trial 
Transcript, April 29, page 84, lines 6-19; Trial Transcript, April 29, page 101, lines 2-22). 
Petitioner filed for divorce following the separation. See Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 
564 (Utah 1983) (Defendant agreed to the terms of the settlement and did not raise 
objection for nearly three years; it was then unfair to claim she has equal interest in the 
present value of the home and force ex-spouse to sell residence); Land, supra, at 1250-1251 
("'Equity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away 
simply because one has come to regret the bargain made."). 
17 
This Court in 1990 held that in order to resolve a husband and wife's disagreement 
as to the scope and meaning of a postnuptial agreement, it would apply ~-normal rules of 
contract constniction.'' D'Aston v. D'Aston, 808 P.2d 111, 113-114 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The Court in D'Aston went on to state that "[t]he core principle is that in construing this 
contract, we first look to the four comers of the agreement to determine the parties' 
intentions ... Id. In this case, the trial courf s interpretation and modification of the 
settlement agreement were due, in large part, to its misclassification and misunderstanding 
of the owner of separate property and assets. 
A. BANK ACCOUNTS 
The Court erred in determining that the bank accounts were not sufficiently 
identified to justify that provision of the separation agreement unenforceable and deeming 
them marital property. The bank accounts as of April, 2015 are as follows: 
LAFCU acct ending #400 $345,020 
LAFCU acct ending #401 $860.50 
Chase Account $2,400.22 
-- ------, 
MACU $250.00 
Hawaii Credit Union $166,694 
EAS Attorney Trust $310,000 
Total $865,224.72 
18 
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The bank accounts maintained roughly the same balances at time of separation agreement 
(---$892,000) when compared to the time of trial ( ~$833,000). Overwhelming evidence 
showed that the parties had identified the speci fie bank accounts as their separate accounts. 
Despite the fact that they were titled jointly-a notion only argued by Petitioner after she 
was advised by her counsel to refuse to remove the monthly payments that were being 
deposited by Respondent in accordance with the separation agreement. (Transcript, April 
29, page 71, L 10 through page 72, L 2) (Trial Transcript, April 29, page 84, lines 6-19; 
Trial Transcript, April 29, page 10 l, lines 2-22). 
Petitioner did not argue ambiguity as to the owner of certain funds and accounts. 
Nor did she claim not to know the identity of the accounts. Nonetheless, the activity in the 
accounts remained the same after the separation agreement, showing that they have been 
used in the same manner during and after the execution of the separation agreement. At 
trial, Respondent testified about the banking activity and that Petitioner never used the 
bank accounts that were referred to as Respondenf s his. See Transcript April 29, page 134 
L 6-1 l and L 23-25, page 171, L 6-22 and Transcript April 30, page 83, L 2-19). (Transcript 
April 29, page 118, L 4-12). Petitioner testified that she did not write checks from the bank 
account or use the accounts. Utah precedent stipulates that in making this assessment, the 
court "look[s] to a party's actions as a manifestation of a spouse's intent to contribute 
separate property to the marital estate." Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ,r 28 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2015), citing Dahl, supra, at ,I 143. 
19 
The purpose of property division, the Utah Supreme Court held, ••is to allocate 
property in the manner \Vhich ·best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to 
pursue their separate lives."' Noble, supra, at 1373, quoting Burke, supra, at 135. Indeed, 
it is appropriate for the trial court and for the court on appeal ··to survey the total situation 
of both parties; and to arrive at such arrangement as the interests of justice require, and 
with the objective in mind of minimizing difficulties and providing the soundest possible 
foundation for the parties to re-adjust their lives on a happy and useful basis." Ehninger v. 
Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104, 1105-1106 (Utah 1977). See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16 
(Utah 2013) ( court erred in declining to consider a credit to the husband for separate 
property). However, the trial court failed to accurately contemplate the total circumstances 
of the parties and to result in an arrangement that was equitable in the interest of justice. 
The trial Court held that the parties did not specify how to divide their financial accounts 
and that the provision regarding the division of the checking account was ambiguous. 
However, both parties agreed to the settlement and lived under it for sixteen ( 16) months. 
B. PROPERTY DIVISION PER THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT. 
There was no dispute as to the personal property, including the financial accounts 
in the possession of the parties. (Findings of Fact No. 31) The parties also identified the 
lots as the separate property of Respondent; the trial Court acknowledging this, made this 
finding in the original judgment. Nonetheless, the Court failed to recognize the fact that 
the lots were sold, and the money deposited into Respondent's bank account. This was 
corrected in the post-trial orders, and Respondent was credited with the proceeds of 
20 
n i ' 
~ 
n 
w 
D 
□ 
n 
; ! 
iJ 
n 
I I 
!&rd 
n 
' I 
, I 
iiliJ 
I• 
r 
$335,000. Petitioner agreed to receive $2,000/month for life or a $400,000 lump sum. 
Nonetheless, the Court substituted its own contractual terms that the $400,000 lump sum 
payment was ·-alimony" awarded to Petitioner on top of the Court's distribution of the 
estate. This was not the intent of the parties. The court also found that the $2,000 per month 
was to last for the length of the marriage. In addition, the bank accounts, including funds 
were to be awarded to each party. The LA Fireman·s Credit Union account ending in #400 
belonged separately to Respondent name and was only established prior to the marriage 
with his sister as the joint account holder. (Transcript April 29, page 112, L 9-18) 
(Transcript April 29, page 118, L 4-12). Each party was awarded his or her own pension 
plan. Respondent's pension plan. 
The trial Court improperly ruled that $305,000 was part of the marital estate as 
··loans." which in essence created a marital estate larger than it was in fact. This inflation 
of the estate's value resulted in an inaccurate distribution of the estate. Testimony was 
presented that evidenced the loans were paid back, and that these funds were lent and repaid 
quickly. (Transcript April 30, Page 51 lines 18-23), (Transcript April 30, Page 52 lines 14-
18) (G. Sandusky Depo 94, L 10-18, also included Exhibit 6 filed as pleading tiled Exhibits 
6-10 on May 5, 2014). This testimony by Respondent was not contradicted. Further, the 
trial court also required Respondent to pay Petitioner the amount equal to one-half of these 
··loans"-loans that were already repaid to the account. The Court's mandate to pay 
Petitioner caused an incorrect and inequitable distribution to Petitioner. This should be 
corrected to reflect the true nature of the assets and the financial arrangements agreed to 
21 
by the parties. The Utah Supreme Court stated that a property settlement agreement is not 
binding upon the trial court in a divorce action. ~~such agreement should be respected and 
given considerable weight in the court's determination of an equitable division." Clausen, 
supra, at 564, citing Jackson v. Jackson, Utah, 617 P.2d 338 ( 1980). 
C. INEQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
Utah has a long-established policy in favor of the equitable distribution of niarital 
assets in divorce cases. Utah Code § 30-3-5(1) authorizes Utah courts to enter "equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties" in a divorce. Id. 
In Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court stated that 
··[t]he import of our decisions implementing [section 30-3-5] is that proceedings in regard 
to the family are equitable in a high degree; and that the court may take into consideration 
all of the pertinent circumstances." Id. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1988). See Dahl, supra, at 125 (Utah 2015) ("Thus, by legislative enactment and our long-
standing precedent, Utah has an interest in ensuring that marital assets are fairly and 
equitably distributed during divorce and that divorcing spouses both retain sufficient assets 
to avoid becoming a public charge."). Indeed, the Noble Court stated that '~[t]he 
overarching aim of a property division, and of the decree of which it and the alimony award 
are subsidiary parts, is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties." Id., 
at 13 73. Here it is clear that the decision of the trial court does not conform with the 
Separation Agreement, prior Utah precedent or any notion of equity. 
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Finally, in the alternative, if the Court of Appeals adheres to the lower Court's ruling 
that the bank accounts were marital property rather than separate property (as Respondent 
believes was sufficiently identified to and understood in the separation agreement) those 
funds were not divided equitably. [See chart above as to how they should be divided] (Nov. 
2, 2015 hearing court calculations). At the November 2, 2015 hearing, Judge Pettit 
erroneously added in a fictional $90,000 (monies already spent by Petitioner that she 
testified to (Transcript April 29, page 87, L 6-12). By initially adding in a fictional $90,000 
as if it exists to the sum of the existing marital assets, it inflates the existing assets resulting 
in an unequal division of the assets. Sequentially, this domino effect continues creating 
miscalculations throughout the division of the financial accounts to the parties, as each new 
sum continues to be inaccurate from the fabricated starting balance of what exists. To 
correct this mistake and to accurately account for the $90,000 that Petitioner took and 
spent, the Respondent receives a $45,000 ··credit" during the division of the financial 
accounts, \Vhereas Petitioner receives a $45,000 ··debit" during the division of the financial 
accounts, as she has already spent her share and Respondent's share of this marital money. 
Judge Pettit's calculations '"$865,224.72 deduct the $335K from that, takes you down to 
532,224.72, add the 90K back in, that gets you to $622,224.72, divide that by 2, which is 
$310,112.36, take off $45K that she already has used, or taken, and that gets her to 
265,112.36" (11/2/15 Hearing CD, second file, SILVERCRT03, 17:27:26-17:28:07) 
The trial court is required to provide adequate factual findings which reveal how the 
court reached its conclusions, Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 
23 
1993 ), and to "establish[] that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is 
supported by, the evidence," Dahl, supra. This Court noted that ~-the touchstone of adequate 
findings is that they are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 11 
Hall, supra, at I 021 ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Adequate findings of 
fact II enable 'meaningful appellate review"' because an appellate court can understand the 
trial court's reasoning and assess its compliance with governing law. Keyes, supra, at ,r 29, 
citing Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 61,247 P.3d 380 (Utah 2011) (quoting Willey v. Willey. 
951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997)). This Court will find the reasoning of the trial court 
confused and difficult to understand. Although the trial court found the Separation 
Agreement valid, it did not follow its intent and distribution. The trial court did not show 
how the ··loans" could possibly be part of the calculations, but instead just deemed them to 
be so. The Court below based its reasoning and conclusions on inaccurate information and 
miscalculations, which included as part of the division of assets, some that do not exist 
and/or had been converted to cash in the financial accounts, including also $90,000 
petitioner spent prior to trial. In either event, such a conclusion ··works such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 
6 (Utah 1982). 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY AND PAST 
DUE ALIIVIONY. 
Foremost the Court's ruling did not follO\v the parties' agreement with regard to the 
monthly payments and/or lump sum award. The Court used its award of alimony as a 
trump card in Petitioner's favor to an inequitable distribution of the parties' assets. This is 
contrary to the Separation Agreement. The Court ruled the Separation Agreement and 
Addendum valid (Findings of Fact Nos. 19-21) but contradictorily interpreted the 
Agreement inequitably against its purpose. The Court found that Respondent's testimony 
as to the intent and basis for the property distribution in the Separation Agreement was in 
direct conflict with the language of the agreement, specifically Article 4. (Findings of Fact 
No. 39). Hm,vever this language refers to "the property settlement of the parties" which is 
incorporated in and accounted for in the agreement itself, particularly in the parties' bank 
account distributions. The property distribution of the Separation Agreement considered 
the entire marital estate. The Court disregarded the parties' agreement regarding the 
distribution of the financial accounts allowing for funds to pay the $2,000 monthly payment 
or terminating such monthly payments for a lump sum payment which represented 
Petitioner's property distribution. Instead the Court re-distributed the financial accounts 
and then awarded alimony in addition, against the intent of the Separation Agreement. This 
reallocation and interpretation resulted in an incorrect and inequitable distribution, despite 
the Court's recognition that an '"equitable distribution" under Utah law is required. 
25 
Notwithstanding, as the party seeking an award of alimony, Petitioner bore the 
burden of providing the district court with sufficient credible evidence of each factor listed 
in the Alimony Statute. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, iJ 108 (Utah 2015). See Dority v. Dority, 
Utah, 645 P .2d 56, 59 (1982) ( citations omitted) t·Court \Vill not disturb trial court's 
distribution of property and award of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown."). 
Again, the parties complied with separation agreement for 16 months. (Findings of 
Fact Nos. 23 and 27). Petitioner did not raise any issue with the agreed-upon arrangement. 
In Utah, the decree must be determined ··upon the facts~ the conditions, and the 
circumstances of the parties in each particular case ... " Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 
553, 559 (Utah 1936). Further, if. after examination of the record, the court is ··convinced 
that the award in the trial court is inequitable and unjust,,. it must modify the decree '·as it 
finds to be just and equitable." Id. ··The amount of alimony is measured by the wife's needs 
and requirements, considering her station in life, and upon the husband's ability to pay." 
As the party seeking an award of permanent alimony, Petitioner bore the burden of 
providing the district court with sufficient credible evidence of each factor listed in the 
Alimony Statute. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, iJ 108 (Utah 2015). See Dority v. Dority, Utah, 
645 P .2d 56, 59 ( 1982) ( citations omitted) ("·Court will not disturb trial court's distribution 
of property and award of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion is shown.'} In this case, Petitioner did not argue for alimony, did not 
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prove any of factors (See Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at Section 
Conclusions of Law, subsection D, Pages 33-35). In her financial declaration, Petitioner 
declared a $1500/month deficit, however, the evidence at trial did not support the deficit. 
The trial court gave no weight whatsoever and completely disregarded the evidence: 
Petitioner's testimony on loan from sister 40K AND 65K inheritance (Transcript April 29, 
page, 45 L 20 and page 84, L 20 through page 8, L 11 ). Petitioner's testimony that she took 
90K (Transcript April 28, page 262, L 4-9)of additional income that Petitioner possessed 
and spent from June, 2011 to the time of trial. This was supported by tax returns and her 
testimony of a $26,500 income, $90,000 taken from Respondent's bank account, and a 
· $65,000 inheritance. This breaks down over period of 2011 when she filed for divorce to 
the trial, to an excess of $53,000 annually or over $4,400/month. This is more than 
Petitioner was accustomed to during the marriage, when she received $2,000 per month 
plus $1800 month rent for her and the parties· son (Transcript April 30, page 72, L 4-13 
and page 212, L 17-18). Petitioner made no claim for alimony, as it was readily apparent 
to the court from the evidence that no need existed, and that Respondent did not have the 
ability to pay such alimony from his retirement income of approximately $3,000/month. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that it was '·the duty and prerogative" of this Court in 
equity matters, where the occasion warrants, and after a review of both the facts and the 
law, to fashion its own remedy as a substitute for the judgment of the trial court, but that 
court's actions should only be disturbed to prevent manifest injustice." Penrose v. Penrose, 
656 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1982). The trial court's rulings on alimony and past alimony, 
based on the record, clearly show an abuse of discretion. 
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Assuming arguendo, that this Court was to accepts the trial court's ruling that past 
due alimony in the amount of $96,000 (since July 2011) was owed, the calculation of the 
trail court is in error. The number of months such ··alimony" or monthly payments was due 
was in excess of what would be required, as Petitioner withdrew $90,000 from the bank 
account in June 2011. This was the date on which she filed for divorce and withdrew this 
sum as prepaid ··alimony"-or a portion of her lump sum payment due to her under the 
separation agreement. Respondent placed the remaining $310,000 balance of the lump 
sum due to Petitioner per the Separation Agreement, in trust per her request and Motion in 
May 2013. At that time only 22 months of payments were due. An amount beyond this was 
excess and a windfall to Petitioner. 
Finally. Petitioner's election of the lump sum per the Separation Agreement resulted 
in her receiving what amounted to half of the marital estate having a value of $800,000. 
Alimony must be considered in total distribution in determining need. The Court's order 
in this case, classifying essentially everything marital awarded Petitioner half of the marital 
estate and alimony. This is not what was intended in the Separation Agreement. The Utah 
Alimony Statute, Utah Code § 30-3-5(8), lists seven factors that a court must consider in 
making an alimony determination. The first three are: (i) the financial condition and needs 
of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
and (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Utah Code§ 30-3-5(8)(a). These 
first three factors are a codification of the Supreme Court's analysis in Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, l 075 (Utah 1985), and are often referred to as the Jones factors. A party seeking 
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alimony bears the burden of demonstrating to the court that the Jones factors support an 
award of alimony. Dahl, supra, at il 95. In order to satisfy this burden, Petitioner must 
provide the court with "a credible financial declaration and financial documentation to 
demonstrate that the Jones factors support an award of alimony." Bakanowski v. 
Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, il 9, 80 P.3d 153 (Utah 2003). Clearly Petitioner did not 
satisfy these factors based on the evidence on the record. Further, a Court's failure to 
consider the Jones factors when determining an appropriate alimony award "constitutes an 
abuse of discretion." Dahl, supra, at il 9, citing Paff el v. Paff el, 732 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah 
1986). Here alimony was included in and not an additional component to the parties 
understanding. Further, Petitioner has not demonstrated a need, and Respondent does not 
have the ability to pay. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING THE SEPARATION 
AGREEl\tlENT UNENFORCEABLE. 
A divorcee decree is reviewed for ambiguity under a correctness standard. Eyring 
v. Fairbanks, 918 P.2d 489,491 (Utah Ct. app. 1996); Allen v. Hall, 2005 UT App 23,il8 
(Utah Ct. App. 2005). Here the trial court found inconsistently ··that '·there are no instances 
of material non-disclosure; both parties were well aware of the financial situation 
throughout the marriage" that renders the Agreement unenforceable. The trial court in its 
ruling outlined what it described as an "equitable disposition of property" in conjunction 
with the Separation Agreement. However, the Court identified and referenced in its 
Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce assets that exceed $2.2 million dollars-
approximately double the amount of the actual assets of the marital estate presented by the 
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evidence. In light of this fact, the distribution of the martial assets was overstated and not 
equitable, with Petitioner receiving excess of $950,000 more than ¾ of the total marital 
estate. Based on the evidence in the record, the trial court committed legal error and 
improperly ruled on the property included in the marital estate. The separation agreement 
was not sufficiently ambiguous as to warrant the court's re-disposition of property already 
agreed-upon by the parties. The courfs calculations were in error, and it relied upon those 
incorrect results to modify the parties' settlement. 
In order to determine the proper interpretation of the divorce decree, the court must 
determine \Vhether the document is "sufficiently ambiguous that extrinsic evidence is 
necessary to interpret it." Draper Bank & Trust v. United States, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16446 (D. Utah Oct. 25, 1994). Where a divorce decree that is ambiguous and incomplete, 
the trial court may use extraneous evidence to determine the meaning of the language in 
the decree. Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d l 027 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Ambiguity exists, the 
Utah Supreme Court held, if a provision "is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ,r 20, 54 P.3d 1139 
(Utah 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Redd v. Hill, 2013 UT 35, ,r 18 (Utah 
2013), citing Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995) (stating 
that an ambiguous interpretation must be "reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract"). However, that was not the case \Vith the parties' agreement. The bank accounts 
were clearly understood as to the party's ownership. Assuming arguendo that there was 
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sufficient ambiguity, Respondent presented undisputed evidence as to the meanmg 
(Transcript April 29, page 134 L 6-11 and L 23-25, page 171, L 6-22 and Transcript April 
30, page 83, L 2-19). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR AND 
11\'IPROPERLY RULED IN DENYING A NE\V TRIAL. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)-(a)( 1) provides that a court may grant a new trial, amend or 
make new findings of fact and conclusions of law, or direct the entry of a new judgment 
based on "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order 
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial"), or because of accident or surprise. The court will reverse" ... if there is no reasonable 
basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991). 
[Denial of the grant of a new trial is usually reviewed for abuse of discretion. Promax Dev. 
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 253 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1997). See Jensen v. Jensen, 555 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah 1976]. Standard of review 
However, where the trial court relied on its interpretation of a contract provision as 
grounds for denying the motion, the legal decision is reviewed under a correctness 
standard. Booth v. Booth, 2006 UT App 144, ,r 10 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), citing Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Horrell v. State Fann Bureau Ins. Co., 
909 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Corbett v. Seamons, 904 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). Standard of Review. Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "·in a 
divorce proceeding, which is sometimes said to be equitable in the highest degree, the 
granting of a motion for a new trial need not involve setting aside the resolution of all 
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issues, but can be limited to reopening the case to just whatever extent the court deems 
necessary and desirable in the interests of justice:· Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072, l 074 
(Utah 1977). In this case, the interests of justice are served by a fair adjudication on 
accurate and correct calculations, as well as an acknowledgement of the facts on the record 
which show the tme ownership of the banking accounts. The separation agreement 
accurately provided this information, and the trial judge should be instmcted to adhere to 
this agreement and base any adjustments on the undisputed facts on the record. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT A \V ARD ING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Based on the actions of Petitioner, the trial Court should have awarded attorney fees 
to Respondent. The Utah Supreme Court has held that, in divorce cases, ··an a\vard of 
attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is a reasonable amount and reasonably 
needed by the party requesting the award." Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419-420 (Utah 
1986), citing Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984). And just this year, this Court noted 
that a court failed to make the requisite finding of reasonableness and remanded the case 
to allow the district court to address the issue of reasonableness and to enter related 
findings. NOTES: case law and argument regarding attorney fees in contract. Bhongir v. 
Mantha, 2016 UT App 99, 1 24 (Utah Ct. App. 2016). This Court has reversed an award of 
attorney fees and costs when either financial need or reasonableness has not been shown. 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The Court found no basis 
to support Petitioner's challenge of the Separation Agreement valid and therefore it was 
reasonable to award attorney fees to Respondent. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent requests that this Court reverse the decision of 
the trial court; direct that the court to modify its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to correct its errors in the interpretation of the Separation Agreement, its miscalculations 
of the assets and inequitable distribution. Specifically, interpret and enforce the terms of 
the Separation Agreement as the parties' had lived by for 16 months; Distribute the assets 
including the financial accounts equally after distribution of the $400,000 funds are 
attributed to Respondent as his separate property and the lump sum payment of $400,000 
is attributed to Petitioner as her separate property and Distribute the assets equitably in 
order for the Respondent to have a fair resolution of this matter. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2016 
Attorney for Respondent/ Appellant 
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